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SYMPOSIUM: "LESSONS FROM THE SADDAM TRIAL".
TRANSCRIPT: ANALYSIS OF THE DUJAIL TRIAL
Marieke Wierdat & Miranda Sissonsl
MS. WIERDA: Our task here today is to look beyond the antics of the Dujail
trial-which are well known and described in the title of this
panel-and to ask ourselves some detailed questions about the trial.
We must scrutinize the justice delivered by the Iraqi High Tribunal
and ask whether Iraqi people are receiving the quality of justice
they deserve. The challenge is to examine the trial in a way that
looks at these issues objectively and from a technical rather than
purely political viewpoint.
The involvement of the International Center for Transi-
tional Justice in monitoring the trial has been extensive. My col-
league, Miranda Sissons, attended numerous sessions on four sepa-
rate missions to Iraq, and our Iraqi consultant attended most of the
remainder. We were present for eighty-five percent of all the ses-
sions and monitored the trial in its original language, Arabic. Prior
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to the trial, in 2003 we had conducted a population survey in Iraq of
public expectations in regard to justice for past crimes.' Further-
more, an important part of our work has been to dialogue directly
with the Iraqi participants in the trial. The issues that we are raising
at this conference have been discussed directly and repeatedly with
the Iraqi High Tribunal. Nothing that we say here would surprise
them. We are grateful for the ability to have frank exchanges with
them, and indeed we admire the courage of those involved in the
trials.
In examining this enormously significant trial of a former
head of state and his senior officials at the domestic level, we need
to ask four questions. Firstly, has the trial succeeded in affirming
the centrality of the rule of law in the new political order of Iraq?
Secondly, has it been successful in uncovering the full extent of the
system crimes that were perpetrated during the era of Saddam Hus-
sein? Thirdly, is it demonstrating and preserving international stan-
dards of fairness, even for these unpopular defendants? I will be
brief on this point since other speakers at this conference are going
to address it in detail. Finally, is the trial restoring the dignity of
victims or having a broader societal impact?
First, on whether the trial is reaffirming the centrality of the
rule of law, I will not deal here with the issue of the legality of the
tribunal's establishment.2 That topic will surface throughout the day
and is in part political, in part legal. Politically, I think the question
of perception of legitimacy is not just a national issue but also a re-
gional one. In the region, there has been a widespread (but not uni-
form) perception that the trial is not legitimate. For instance, I was
in Khartoum a few weeks ago, where the perception of the process
is that it is totally illegitimate and staged by America. This affects
its ability to serve as a regional precedent.
Another factor inhibiting the ability of the trial to reaffirm
centrality of the rule of law is the level of political inference. Here,
one of the most negative developments has been the removal of
judges serving at the Iraqi High Tribunal, or their resignation due to
indirect political interference. In the Dujail trial, the five judges that
started the trial were not the five judges that finished it: only two of
the original bench remained. This impinges the ability of the court
to hear and evaluate the totality of the evidence.
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE/HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, IRAQI
VOICES: ATTITUDES TOWARDS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION (May
2004), http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/0/108.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Briefing Paper, ICTJ, Creation and First Trials of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal
Tribunal, Oct. 2005, http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/2/123.pdf.
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Indeed, the tribunal's very existence has been put in jeop-
ardy on at least two occasions, when political actors sought to re-
move judges through the process of de-Ba'athification, or most re-
cently, the well-known incident in the Anfal trial, where the presid-
ing judge said to Saddam Hussein, "You are not a dictator." While
some have suggested the IHT requested his removal, our informa-
tion suggests otherwise. 3 These examples of direct political interfer-
ence have been accompanied by a constant catalogue of critical, po-
litical commentary designed to affect the conduct of the judges.4
We think that political interference, and its deleterious effect on the
independence and impartiality of the tribunal, remains perhaps the
most significant concern of the Iraqi High Tribunal.
Other factors have also contributed to the perception that
the trial is politicized. The judicial process itself is lacking robust-
ness, and there has been insufficient emphasis on regularizing the
process and anchoring it in legal provisions found in the rules of
criminal procedure. There were also irregularities in the process,
some of which I will address later. Of particular concern was the
lack of responsiveness to defense motions. There is also a lack of
solid administrative capacity at the court. The role of the former
president of the tribunal was an inhibiting factor in developing
sound administrative practices.
The trial has also been marked by lapses in judicial de-
meanor of various degrees of seriousness. For example, during a
session on July 24, 2006, Presiding Judge Rauf said to Barzan al-
Tikriti, former chief of intelligence, "Ever since you were a child,
you have been drowned in blood." To Awad al-Bandar, the former
judge of the Revolutionary Court, he said on the May 31, "I will not
try people in a few hours like you did" (implying that he considers
him guilty of extra-judicial killing). These are lapses that may affect
the perception of impartiality of the judges.
The role of the defense counsel too can be criticized for
lack of professionalism. The defense often resorted to obstructionist
tactics such as staging walkouts.5 These tactics were not in the in-
3 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUDGING DUJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH
TRIBUNAL 40 (Nov. 2006), http://hrw.org/reports/2006/iraq 1106/ (indicating the IHT request
for Judge al-Amiri's transfer occurred after severe public criticism and a visit to the IHT
chambers by a representative of the Prime Minister).
4 See, e.g., al-Sabah al-Jadid, Dec. 6, 2005 (comments by the Minister of Justice in
which he publicly called for the resignation of the presiding judge).
5 The issue of the behavior and professionalism of some privately-retained defense coun-
sel is complex and deserves in-depth treatment. Investigations are reportedly proceeding
against several counsel for obtaining false testimony. These are related to testimony given by
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terest of their clients. On the other hand, some of this behavior may
have been a consequence of the fact that their legal avenues were
constantly blocked. As mentioned, many of their important motions
did not receive any response by the court, including a motion to re-
call prosecution witnesses, and a motion asking for assistance in re-
covering potentially exculpatory evidence, such as the trial dossier
of the Revolutionary Court. These issues cannot just be cured in the
judgment.
As for the role of the defendants themselves, Iraqi law al-
lows for their participation in the trial, but there can be no doubt
that in dealing with high-profile political defendants, self-
representation has introduced a political element into the trial.
However, we should ask ourselves what impact silencing Saddam
Hussein or the other defendants would have had, considering the
difficulties with defense counsel. The result may not have been any
more favorable, and we do not ultimately consider the disruptive
behavior of the defendants to have damaged the trial from a legal
perspective.
On our second point, whether the trial succeeded in uncov-
ering the full extent of the system crimes. This is a technical issue.
On the one hand, the tribunal has attempted to apply certain interna-
tional law concepts such as crimes against humanity, and the doc-
trine of command responsibility for high-level defendants. In prin-
ciple, we all know that these concepts lend themselves well to dem-
onstrating system crimes. However, we are concerned that these
concepts were not used to their full potential in this case. For in-
stance, the prosecution's case did not fully reveal the functioning of
the regime of Saddam Hussein, including the responsibilities of its
various components that were on trial (the Secret Intelligence Ser-
vice, the Popular Army, the General Security Service, the Revolu-
tionary Court, and the Ba'ath party). Instead, the presentation of
evidence concentrated on so-called crime-base evidence (i.e., evi-
dence on the acts of murder, torture, etc.) but without fully demon-
strating the responsibility of those senior defendants who were not
present at the scene of the crimes or linking those defendants to the
crimes.
The strength of the documentary evidence, in our estima-
tion, has been exaggerated by some commentators and do not nec-
essarily fill these gaps. We have examined in detail the dossier in
this case, and the documents give the impression of being hastily
four witnesses in late May 2006. The tribunal did not have sufficient tools as its disposal to
appropriately discipline unprofessional behavior by the defense.
[Vol. 39:209
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assembled in an ad hoc manner. There is no "smoking gun" docu-
ment in terms of ordering the crimes. There are many missing
pieces of evidence, including documents to show that Saddam Hus-
sein was aware of the crimes at the time they were being commit-
ted. In short, the prosecutions should have called expert evidence to
establish the chain of command, therefore linking the defendants to
the crimes.
Finally, the prosecutor did not fully demonstrate how the
alleged facts constituted crimes against humanity or violations of
international law. Instead, confusion permeated the courtroom dur-
ing the presentation of the case, for instance on the applicability of
Iraqi law.6 Lengthy arguments were held on whether minors were
included in those executed in violation of Iraqi law. Similarly, much
effort was expended on whether the Revolutionary Court proceed-
ings were conducted in keeping with Iraqi law. This was confusing
to all participants, including the prosecutor himself, and was dis-
tracting to the defendants, who concentrated too much of their valu-
able time on issues that were not crucial to proving their innocence.
In general, the lack of clarity in terms of presenting the case against
the accused severely hampered their ability to prepare a defense.
The third question pertains to the fairness of the trial. While
I will be brief, suffice it to say that we have major concerns and
think the trial fell short in several crucial areas.7 First, we think that
hearing the defendants themselves was treated by the judges as giv-
ing them their "day in court" and often served as a substitute for al-
lowing them to mount an effective legal defense. The defense was
often treated as a nuisance rather than a necessity. Untimely disclo-
sure of documents-at least forty of which were introduced in court
without having been included in the dossier-amounted to trial by
ambush. 8 Neither were all the statements or identities of the com-
plainants or witnesses disclosed to the defense within any meaning-
ful timeframe, sometimes a mere hour in advance of the testimony.
The statements of numerous complainants were read straight into
the record. This deprived them from the opportunity to prepare for
confronting complainants (neither was there any opportunity to con-
front during the investigative phase). During the testimony of Tariq
6 This was particularly pronounced in relation to the case against 'Awad Hamad al-
Bandar, for example in the session of March 13, 2006.
7 See Briefing Paper, ICTJ, Dujail: Trial and Error? (Nov. 2006), http://www.ictj.org/
images/content/5/9/597.pdf (containing a fuller ICTJ discussion of fairness issues).
8 These statements are made based on exhaustive examination of the Dujail dossier and
three subsequent supplements.
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Aziz, the defense was denied the opportunity to confront the wit-
ness altogether, as the judge did not allow any cross-examination.
Many of these issues relate to equality of arms. For in-
stance, the presiding judge was much stricter with defense on stick-
ing to their pre-prepared witness list and finishing their case, as op-
posed to leeway granted to the prosecutor in terms of presentation
of evidence. It is also unclear whether defense counsel were able to
conduct their own investigations. This was all the more crucial be-
cause the investigative judge had not fulfilled his duty in terms of
gathering exculpatory evidence. We appreciate that security was a
major obstacle, but defense counsel were not even able to visit Du-
jail. Needless to say, this severely hampered their ability to mount
an effective defense by casting doubt on the credibility of prosecu-
tion witnesses, most of which came from Dujail. Finally, we think
that the minor defendants were greatly disadvantaged in being
joined with the high-level defendants, in terms of attention and re-
sources allocated to their individual cases.
Fourth, on whether the trial succeeded in restoring the dig-
nity of victims or whether it had broader social impact. Some victim
testimony in this trial has been very powerful, and we should not be
dismissive of that. However, conducting the trials in the "Green
Zone" in Baghdad is virtually the equivalent of conducting them
outside Iraq, in terms of accessibility for ordinary Iraqis. What
would have ameliorated this is a robust outreach program, but to
our regret the Iraqi High Tribunal has not implemented one to date.
In conclusion, we continue to withhold our final judgment
on the Dujail trial, since we are still awaiting the tribunal's judg-
ment, and since this is but the first in a series of trials. But it is time
to ask ourselves some serious questions about the adequacy of the
Dujail trial. This requires intellectual honesty. Many of us have had
a degree of involvement in our various institutional capacities and
may feel vested in various ways. But honest scrutiny of the trial re-
quires us to set aside our egos, and learn some very hard lessons, so
that we do not contribute to denying Iraqis their quest for adequate
justice.
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